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Volume :3 Issue : 10 1983
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The Logic and Ontological Status of Intentions (in Arabic)
Auther : Shafika Bastaki
The first part of this paper deals with the general logical properties of the concept of intention. In particular, we discuss the properties of referential opacity and the failure of existential generalization, that have been considered among the unique marks of mental concepts. Since some non-mental concepts share these properties, it is indicated that what identifies intention expressions is that if they are added as a prefex to any action sentence whatsoever they create contingent statement, no matter what the truth value of the original sentence is.
The second part reviews the characteristics of two competing analyses of the nature of intention: the: dispositional and the occurent analyses. In comparing the two analyses with the intuitive data with which the study has started, it is concluded that the two analyses are complementary if we draw a deep rooted distinction so far ignored by most investigators in this field namely, the action of forming an intention and having an intention. The rest of the study is devoted to support the thesis that the dispositional analysis accounts well for the concept of having an intention, and the occurrent analysis is suitable for the concept of forming an intention. The above thesis is supported in two stages: first by a critical discussion of the arguents of logical connection and failure of verifying intentions, advanced by supporters of the dispositional and ocurrent analyses: the second stage consists of a critical discussion of a major argument purporting to show that intentions ae not phenomena either because intention is a predicate of actions or because it is a mere linguistic device to justify other people’s expectations as to what we shall do without obligation.